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ON THE 'SUCCESS' OF COURT PACKING 
Robert A. Schapiro* 
History may be radically contingent or it may be overde-
termined. Crushing a small creature may have drastic results,1 as 
may saving the life of a person meant to die.2 On the other hand, 
shootin~ a Tyrannosaurus rex may have no discernible effect on 
history. 
Are various constitutional episodes more like the butterfly, 
seemingly slight, but producing dramatic effects, or like the di-
nosaur, seemingly grand, but which may be erased without a 
trace? One need not find textualism extinct to conclude that in 
this regard, constitutional language may be more dinosaur than 
butterfly. A brief detour into non-counterfactual history pres-
ents the evidence. How would constitutional law change if the 
words "equal protection of law" were removed from the Fifth 
Amendment? Presumably, not very much.4 What if the drafters 
of the Eleventh Amendment had specified that the provision 
barred only suits against states by citizens of other states? 
* . Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to 
Terry Gordon, J. Marcus Meeks, and Benjamin Sawyer for their skilled research assis-
tance. 
I. Sec Ray Bradbury, The Sound of Thunder, in The Golden Apples of the Sun 144 
(Greenwood Press, 1953) (the killing of a pre-historic butterfly changes the course of his-
tory). 
2. In the Star Trek episode, The City on the Edge of Forever, Dr. McCoy goes back 
in time and saves the life of a social worker, Edith Keeler. Keeler goes on to delay the 
entry of the United States into World War II, allowing Germany to conquer the world. 
Captain Kirk's grim task is to return to the past and ensure that Keeler dies on schedule. 
3. See Bradbury, The Sound of Thunder (cited in note 1). The story suggests that 
the fabric of time would not be disturbed by shooting a dinosaur that would have died 
shonly from other causes. 
4. Compare U.S. Const., Amend. V (containing no equal protection clause) with 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) {finding equal protection component of due proc-
ess clause). State constitutional interpretation demonstrates a similar tendency. See, 
e.g., Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 215, 220 
(1992) {discussing the New Jersey Supreme Coun's use of due process and equal protec-
tion principles despite the absence of such textual provisions in the New Jersey Constitu-
tion). 
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Again, res ipsa loquitur.5 In neither instance has the particular 
constitutional language proved especially significant. But what 
about grander constitutional events? Can altering one historical 
conjuncture transform all that follows? To explore this question, 
I consider one of the most notorious aspects of the twentieth 
century's greatest constitutional momene President Franklin 
Roosevelt's failed plan to "pack" the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Buoyed by a landslide victory in the election of 1936 and in-
creasingly frustrated by a Supreme Court that was striking down 
key features of the New Deal, President Roosevelt decided to 
launch a frontal attack on the judicial opposition. On February 
5, 1937, President Roosevelt presented a judicial reorganization 
bill to Congress. The proposed legislation would have allowed 
him to appoint an additional Justice to the United States Su-
preme Court for every member of the Court who refused to re-
tire or resign within six months after turning 70.7 The plan would 
have given Roosevelt six appointments immediately and would 
have permanently increased the size of the Court to 15. 
In early July 1937, it appeared that some version of the 
"court-packing" plan would likely become law.8 But all that 
changed with an unexpected passing. On July 14, 1937, Joe 
Robinson, the Majority Leader of the United States Senate who 
spearheaded the President's congressional efforts, was found 
dead in his bedroom, the apparent victim of a heart attack.9 The 
reorganization plan died with the Majority Leader. 10 What if 
Senator Robinson had survived the grueling congressional de-
bates and the torrid Washington summer and had shepherded 
the President's proposal safely through Congress? 
5. Compare U.S. Const., Amend. XI with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
54 (1996) ("Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Arti-
cle lii diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says ... .' " (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (1991))). 
6. I follow here Bruce Ackerman's typology of the three great constitutional mo-
ments, the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the 
People: Foundations (Harvard U. Press, 1991). 
7. Sec 81 Cong. Rec. 880-81 (1937). 
8. Sec William E. Lcuchtcnburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional 
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 148-50 (Oxford U. Press, 1995). Opinions on this mat-
ter vary. Sec Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Con-
stitutional Revolution 24-25 (Oxford U. Press, 1998) (suggesting that the bill could not 
have survived the opposition in both the Senate and the House). 
9. Sec Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 266-67 (DaCapo Press, 
1938). 
I 0. See Lcuchtcnberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 152 (cited in note 8). 
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The warnings of the bill's opponents could not have been 
more dire. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee cau-
tioned: 
[The bill's] ultimate operation would be to make this Gov-
ernment one of men rather than one of law, and its practical 
operation would be to make the Constitution what the execu-
tive or legislative branches of the Government choose to say 
it is-an interpretation to be changed with each ... administra-
tion.11 
Would passage of the bill have succeeded in undermining 
the constitutional order? Would it have safeguarded the wishes 
of the majority against an out-of-touch Court? 
As it was, the proposal itself produced both substantial 
benefits and extraordinary harms for the President. I would like 
to suggest that a different disposition of the bill would not have 
altered these consequences. 
The plan exacted a heavy political toll, hindering the Presi-
dent's domestic and foreign policy agenda. 12 President Roose-
velt's dogged efforts to pass the court-packing plan energized his 
opponents and alienated his friends. 1 An ultimate legislative 
victory would not have appeased either group, nor would con-
gressional approval have lessened the charges of interference 
with the judiciary. 
On the other hand, President Roosevelt believed that the 
proposal achieved much of its purpose, even in defeat. He 
termed his message of February 5 "a turning point in our mod-
ern history .... "14 A leading historian of the period agrees that 
"in the long history of the Supreme Court, no event has had 
more momentous conse~uences than Franklin Roosevelt's mes-
sage of February 1937." 5 In the famous "switch in time that 
saved nine," the then-existing Court upheld important New Deal 
legislation.16 Deaths and retirements allowed Roosevelt to name 
II. S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.% (1937) (reprinted in Louis Fisher and 
Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 96 (West, 1992). 
12. See Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 156-61 (cited in note 8). 
13. Sec id. 
14. Sec 6 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1937) reprinted in 
Fisher and Devins, Political Dynamics at 86 (cited in note II). 
15. Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 162 (cited in note 8). 
16. Some evidence suggests that the court-packing plan did not influence the 
Court's decisions in these cases. Sec Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 18-25 
(cited in note 8). Overall, the evidence as to the motivations for the "switch" has been 
termed "equivocal." See Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 343 (Har-
vard U. Press, 1998). 
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seven Justices in the next five years. Ten years after his death, a 
majority of the Justices remained Roosevelt appointees. It 
seems hard to believe that a legislative success could have trans-
lated into a more favorable judicial reception for Roosevelt's 
policies. 
What would have been the longer term effects had Roose-
velt's plan been enacted? With regard to the composition of the 
Court, it is almost impossible to predict the consequences of ei-
ther Roosevelt's initial proposal or a later compromise plan, 
which would have allowed one additional appointment each cal-
endar year for every Justice over 75.17 One guesses that a larger 
Court with more frequent appointments would dampen the in-
fluence of any single President, but reckoning the results re-
quires a greater quantum mechanic than I. The effects of a plan 
that did not change the size of the Court permanently might be 
easier to trace. Consider for example, if the additional appoint-
ments at age 70 expanded the Court only temporarily until the 
elder Justice departed. If one engages in some further simplify-
ing assumptions, a dramatic effect does occur.18 
17. Sec Lcuchtenbcrg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 148 (cited in note 8). 
18. For purposes of the next paragraph, I assume that a President could have ap-
pointed an additional Justice for every member of the Court who turned 70, but did not 
step down during that presidency. For example, Justice Black's turning 70 in 1956 would 
have given President Eisenhower an additional appointment. However, Justice Reed's 
turning 70 in 1954 would not have given President Eisenhower an additional appointment 
because President Eisenhower actually did appoint the replacement when Justice Reed 
retired in 1957. Similarly, because President Nixon did name Justice Harlan's successor 
in 1971, President Nixon would not have received an additional appointment on account 
of Justice Harlan's turning 70 in 1969. 
Further, in view of the potential for the opposition party to delay an appointment, I 
assume that when a Justice attains the age of 70 after September in a presidential elec· 
tion year, the President elected that November makes the appointment. Thus President 
Eisenhower receives the benefit of Justice Frankfurter's turning 70 in November, 1952, 
and President Nixon nominates an additional Justice because Justice Douglas turned 70 
in October, 1968. On the other hand, because Justice Brennan attained 70 in April, 1976, 
I give an additional appointment to President Ford. Transferring the Brennan appoint· 
ment to President Carter would magnify the Carter windfall described later in the text. 
Finally, I ignore the capacity of prior appointments to subtract from appointments 
actually made. For example, President Kennedy's additional appointment when Chief 
Justice Warren turned 70 in 1961 might have interfered with President Nixon's ability to 
make an appointment when the Chief retired in 1969, but that problem is not taken into 
account. In effect, this proviso unrealistically assumes that the additional appointee 
would retire at the same time as the Justice who triggered the appointment. 
My defense for these assumptions is that I believe they magnify, as well as clarify, 
the effects of the plan, and my argument is that even these effects, though interesting, are 
not ultimately substantial. 
The following table lists the Justices who turned 70 after the Roosevelt administra· 
tion, and the President who would have made the hypothetical additional appointments 
under the above assumptions: 
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Based on the ages of the 1 ustices, such a plan, if adopted, 
would have granted no additional appointments to Presidents 
Truman and Johnson. Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton would each have gained one nomi-
nee. President Eisenhower would have gained two appoint-
ments. The most striking result would have been the change in 
the fortunes of President Carter, who was one of only four 
Presidents in history to make no appointments to the Supreme 
Court.19 Under the plan described above, President Carter 
Justice Year Turned 70 Year of Actual President Who 
Retirement Would Receive 
Hypothetical 
Appointment 
Roberts 1945 1945 [no additional 
appointment] 
Frankfurter 1952 1962 Eisenhower 
Reed 1954 1957 [no additional 
appointment J 
Black 1956 1971 Eisenhower 
Burton 1958 1958 [no additional 
appointment] 
Warren 1961 1969 Kennedy 
Douglas 1968 1975 Nixon 
Harlan 1969 1971 [no additional 
appointment] 
Brennan 1976 1990 Ford 
Burger 1977 1986 Carter 
Powell 1977 1986 Carter 
Blackmun 1978 1994 Carter 
Marshall 1978 1991 Carter 
White 1987 1993 Reagan 
Stevens 1990 Bush 
Rehnquist 1994 Clinton 
19. The other three were Presidents William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and 
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would have been able to name four Supreme Court Justices.20 It 
is exciting to speculate on how four Carter appointees might 
have reshaped some of the major decisions of the 1980s, such as 
McCleskey v. Kemp21 and Bowers v. Hardwick. 22 Warren 
McCleskey and Michael Hardwick might have had their claims 
vindicated by a vote of 8-6.23 Justice Powell would have been a 
simple dissenting voice, rather than a remorseful decisive vote.24 
I have used various assumptions to construct a scenario in-
volving dramatic shifts in Court membership. Even with these 
changes, though, would legal doctrine have been transformed 
fundamentally? Would the Court really have stood in the way of 
a nation bent on executing its fellow citizens? Perhaps a victory 
for Hardwick would have undermined various forms of social 
and legal discrimination, but again it is hard to say. At least in 
the currently debated context of the military, it seems doubtful, 
and outside of that context, Bowers provided no obstacle to Ro-
mer.25 Moreover, while Carter appointments might have created 
precedential barriers for the Rehnquist Court, the Reagan judi-
cial revolution fizzled anyway. Robert Bork might have been a 
revolutionary; Anthony Kennedy is not.26 
Andrew Johnson. Sec John M. Lawlor, Court Packing Revisited: A Proposal for Ration-
alizing the Timing of Appointments 10 the Supreme Court, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 967,968 n.9 
(1986 ). Of these, only President Carter served a full four-year term. 
20. Perhaps it would be less convoluted merely to note that 1907 and 1908 pro-
duced a bumper crop of four Supreme Court Justices: Justices Marshall, Burger, Powell, 
and Blackmun. Justice Brennan, born in April, 1906,just missed this boom. 
21. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (5-4 decision rejecting challenge to alleged racially dis-
criminatory administration of capital sentencing scheme). 
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4 decision allowing criminal prosecution of homosexual 
sodomy). 
23. This tally conservatively assumes that President Ford's hypothetical additional 
appointment would vote with the majority. President Ford's actual appointment, Justice 
Stevens, voted with the dissent in these cases. 
24. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451, 530 (Scribners, 1994) 
(discussing Justice's Powell's expressing regret at these decisions after his retirement). 
25. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional 
amendment that prohibited laws barring discrimination based on sexual orientation); see 
id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority opinion fails to mention, much less 
distinguish, Bowers). 
26. See Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 394-95 (cited in note 16); see 
also Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164 (1988). 
It is also difficult to predict how President Carter's nominees actually would have shifted 
the Court. President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, spent much energy battling 
what he perceived to be the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, as embodied in Vice-
President Mondale. Sec Griffin B. Bell with Ronald J. Ostrow, Taking Care of the Law 
23-36 (William Morrow, 1982). These fights sometimes extended to the issue of judicial 
nominations. See id. at 40-42. As for Attorney General Bell's views on nominations, see 
id. at 40-41 ("So successful were we in placing women on the bench ... that I thought the 
need for affirmative action in picking federal judges had run its course."). 
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Aside from specific nominees, would the adoption of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's proposal have undermined judicial independ-
ence, indeed threatened the rule of law? Again, the over-
whelming message of the episode appears to be that the Court, 
through appointment or otherwise, eventually follows the lead of 
a President who helps to engineer a real constitutional revolu-
tion. A President who attempts to alter the appointment 
mechanism pays a steep political price. 
Perhaps these brief reflections merely emphasize that if one 
looks for constitutional revolutions, particular nominations are 
dinosaurs, mattering much less than the fluttering political reali-
ties. I believe that this message, if true, should be reassuring to a 
democracy. 
Let Joe Robinson live. The nation would survive.27 
27. Indeed, had Robinson lived and managed to push the President's plan through 
Congress, th1s conservative southern Democrat might have received the Supreme Court 
nommauon that Roosevelt had apparently promised to him, but gave to Hugo Black. 
Sec Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 180 (cited in note 8). In view of the 
comparative political dispositions of Black and Robinson, a dead Senator Robinson thus 
might have done more to assure robust judicial support for the New Deal revolution than 
a living (Justice) Robinson. 
